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SECURITY COUNCIL MEDIATION AND 
THE KASHMIR DISPUTE: REFLECTIONS 
ON ITS FAILURES AND POSSIBILITIES 
FOR RENEWAL 
SUMATHI SUBBIAH* 
Abstract: India and Pakistan's conflict over the legal status of Kashmir 
threatens the security of the entire region. In its early mediation efforts, 
the Security Council attempted, but failed, to bring about a permanent 
resolution. This Note argues that one reason for the failure was the 
Security Council's view of the dispute as primarily a political dispute 
without referring sufficiently to the legal framework of Indian and 
Pakistani claims to Kashmir. This Note further argues that, in light of this 
earlier failure, the Security Council could reinsert itself as a mediator by 
understanding this failure and by reengaging India, which has become 
resistant in the last thirty years to international mediation in Kashmir. 
INTRODUCTION 
The territorial conflict between India and Pakistan over the re-
gion of Kashmir has served as the major obstacle to relations between 
the two states and to regional security in South Asia.1 Since the two 
states achieved independence from Great Britain, India and Pakistan 
have occupied different segments of the region and fought four wars, 
in which Kashmir's legal status was either the main inciting factor or 
close to the surface of the armed conflict.2 In the last decade, the 
Kashmiri separatist movements within Indian-controlled Kashmir and 
the declaration of nuclear capabilities by India and Pakistan have in-
creased tensions within the region and created a new element of dis-
trust between the two countries.3 
* Sumathi Subbiah is the Senior Executive Editor of the Boston College International & 
Comparative Law Review. 
1 See SUMIT GANGULY, THE ORIGINS OF WAR IN SoUTH AsiA 9-10 (1994) [hereinafter 
GANGULY, ORIGINs]; Somini Sengupta, The India-Pakistan Tension: The Background, N.Y. 
TIMES, jan. 13, 2002, § 1, at 12. 
2 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 1; Sengupta, supra note 1, at 12. 
g See Erik Eckholm, The India-Pakistan Tension: The B1"ink, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 2002, at 
A6; Sengupta, supra note 1, at 12. 
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The gravity of the threat to the "maintenance of international 
peace and security" that the Kashmir conflict represents makes the 
situation ripe for considering renewed mediation from the United 
Nations (U.N.).4 The Security Council attempted to play a role in the 
mediation at the inception of the conflict. 5 However, its recommenda-
tions and attempts at mediation failed to bring about permanent reso-
lution.6 
The Security Council has remained silent since 1965 when it last 
articulated recommendations and has all but abandoned its mediatory 
role.7 In the meantime, attempts at resolution have been left largely to 
India and Pakistan.s 
This Note analyzes the past and present actions of the U.N. regard-
ing the Kashmir conflict in an effort to answer ( 1) why the Security 
Council failed at the beginning of the conflict to bring a permanent 
solution, and (2) how to reengage India in a new mediatory process. 
Part I describes the historical and legal background to the Kashmir dis-
pute, the Security Council's mediatory actions at the beginning of the 
conflict, and the current situation between India and Pakistan over the 
region. Part II analyzes how the Security Council viewed this dispute 
primarily as a political one-and not sufficiently as a legal one-and 
how this stance weakened its recommendations and contributed to the 
failure of Security Council mediation. Part III considers actions that the 
Security Council could take to break its silence by reasserting itself as 
an effective mediator in the current situation and reengaging India, 
which has become resistant to outside mediation. 
I. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND TO THE KAsHMIR DisPUTE 
AND SECURITY CouNCIL MEDIATION 
A. Roots of Conflict in Decolonization 
The roots of the conflict over Kashmir lie in the demise of the 
British Empire in South Asia.9 During colonial rule, the Kashmir re-
4 See U.N. CHARTER art. 3, para. 1. 
5 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 52-53; Ali Khan, The Kashmir Dispute: A Plan 
for Regioual Cooperation, 31 CoLUM.J. lRANSNAT'L L. 495, 512-16 (1994). 
6 See Khan, supra note 5, at 516. 
7 See id. at 522. 
s See id. at 528-29. 
9 See SUMIT GANGULY, THE CRISIS IN KASHMIR 8 (1997) [hereinafter GANGULY, CRI-
SIS); GANGULY, ORIGINS, sttpra note 1, at 9; ALASTAIR LAMB, KASHMIR, A DISPUTED LEG-
ACY, 1846-1990, at 101 (1991). 
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gion was the princely state ofjammu and Kashmir, an amalgam of five 
different areas with a Muslim-majority population ruled by a Hindu 
maharajah.l0 As one of the 584 princely states within the "para-
mountcy" of the British Empire, Kashmir's legal status was that of a 
closely held protectorate whose status was tantamount to that of a di-
rect colony but that was not technically part of British India. II 
In 1947, when the British government transferred power and par-
titioned its former colonies in British India into the new states of India 
and Pakistan, the British government determined that the legal status 
held by Kashmir and the other princely states would lapse.12 In place of 
this legal status, the princely states, which were scattered throughout 
various pockets of South Asia, were given a choice to accede to either 
India or Pakistan.13 According to the Indian Independence Act and the 
British Viceroy's strong wishes, independence from either India or 
Pakistan was strongly discouraged.14 Although the princely states' 
choices produced heated controversy among India, Pakistan, and the 
people of each region, each princely state was incorporated into either 
India or Pakistan within two months of the official British departure 
and transfer of power in August 194 7, except for Kashmir.I5 
The ruler of Kashmir, Maharajah Hari Singh, stalled in making a 
decision about accession in the hopes of negotiating to become an 
independent state, which placed the region in a legal no-man's-land.l6 
All such negotiations, however, came to a halt in early October 194 7 
when Pakistani "tribesmen" crossed the northern border of Kashmir 
with cooperation from pro-Pakistani Muslims in the northern part of 
Kashmir and occupied one-third of the regionP In response to what 
he saw as an invasion of his state, Hari Singh appealed to neighboring 
India for military assistance. Is 
India would not cross the border into Kashmir, however, unless 
Hari Singh signed the Instrument of Accession, through which Kash-
mir would legally accede to India and come under its sovereign con-
10 See GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 7; Khan, supm note 5, at 496. Hereinafter, the 
region of jammu and Kashmir" will be referred to as "Kashmir" as it is in much of the 
scholarship and press. See GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 7. 
11 GANGULY, CRISIS, supm note 9, at 6. 
12 Id. at 7-8. 
IS Id. 
14 Id. 
15 GANGULY, ORIGINS, supm note 1, at 32-34. 
!6 See id. at 36. 
17SeeGANGULY, CRISIS, supm note 9, at 9-11. 
18 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 36. 
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trol,l9 In addition, although not stated explicitly in the Instrument of 
Accession, the Indian leadership had made broad but vague political 
statements suggesting that the accession would be provisional and 
that the people of Kashmir would have to ratifY accession.20 
Once Hari Singh signed the instrument, thus changing Kashmir's 
legal status, Indian troops entered the territory and stopped the tribal 
advance toward the capital city of Srinagar.21 In the process, Indian 
troops took control of the southern two-thirds of Kashmir.22 The Paki-
stani military entered the region in November 1947 to support the 
invading tribal parties, bringing about the first full-scale Indo-
Pakistani war over Kashmir.23 
B. The Security Council's Initial Mediation Attempts 
With no obvious end in sight to the fighting, India approached 
the U.N. Security Council to lodge a complaint, pursuant to Article 35 
under the U.N. Charter, invoking the Security Council's dispute reso-
lution capacity.24 
For India, the issue before the Security Council was the relatively 
simple one of Pakistani-supported aggression in the face of Indian sov-
ereignty in Kashmir.25 India contended that Kashmir's accession was 
legally binding, bringing the entire region under Indian sovereignty 
and making any Pakistani or Pakistani-supported fighters "invaders. "26 
Within two weeks, Pakistan filed a response and counterclaim, 
pursuant to Article 35 of the U.N. Charter, and framed the situation 
in a fundamentally different way.27 First, Pakistan denied the charge 
of directly giving aid and assistance to the tribesmen, claiming that 
19 See GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 157 (providing text of the Instrument of Ac-
cession signed by Hari Singh); GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 36. 
2° See GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 10 n.23, 157; LAMB, supra note 9, at 136-37. 
21 GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 36-37. 
22 See Sengupta, mpra note 1, at 12. 
23 GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 11; GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 37. 
24 Letter from the Representatives of India Addressed to the President of the Security Council 
Dated 1 January 1948, U.N. Doc. S/628, at 1 (1948) [hereinafter Indian Complaint]; GAN-
GULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 11. 
25 See Indian Complaint, supra note 24, at 1; PAULINE DAWSON, THE PEACEKEEPERS OF 
KAsHMIR 23 ( 1994); Damodar R. SarDesai, The Origins of Kashmir's International Legal Status, 
in PERSPECTIVES ON KAsHMIR 80, 85-86 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1992). 
26 See Indian Complaint, supra note 24, at 1, 3. 
27 Letter from the lviinister of Foreign Affain; of Pakistan Addressed to the Secretary-General 
Dated 15 January 1948 Concerning the Situation in Jammu and Kashmir, U.N. Doc. S/ 646, at 12 
(1948) [hereinafter Pakistani Reply]; LAMB, supra note 9, at 165. 
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they were actors independent from the Pakistani government.2B Sec-
ond, Pakistan broadened the focus of the dispute by raising a litany of 
objections.29 One of these objections was to the validity of Kashmir's 
accession to India.30 Pakistan claimed that the accession had occurred 
by "fraud and violence" and alleged conspiracy between India and 
Hari Singh.31 Pakistan argued that any arrangement between India 
and Hari Singh was illegitimate.32 Any decision about Kashmir's legal 
status should thus be made in reference to the Kashmiri people's will 
through a plebiscite.33 
Upon receiving these letters from India and Pakistan, the Secu-
rity Council assumed jurisdiction to examine the conflict, pursuant to 
Article 34 of the U.N. Charter, and passed Resolutions 38 and 39, its 
first statements on the dispute.34 Resolution 39 established the United 
Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) on January 20, 
1948.35 The UNCIP's established function was (1) to investigate the 
facts that gave rise to the Kashmir dispute, and (2) to exercise any 
mediatory influence likely to smooth away difficulties, to carry out 
directions given by the Security Council, and to report on the prog-
ress of executing the advice and directions of the Security Council.36 
Before the UNCIP reached the region to follow through on its 
mandate, the Security Council passed Resolution 4 7 in April 1948, 
which was and still remains the Security Council's outlined structure for 
a recommended permanent solution.3' Resolution 47 set forth a two-
part recommendation consisting of demilitarization and plebiscite.38 
The resolution called for Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of the 
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from the region, after which India 
would have to withdraw to a military level minimally necessary to main-
tain law and order.39 Once the region had been demilitarized, a U.N.-
28 Pakistani &ply, supra note 27, at 2-3; see LAMB, supra note 9, at 165. 
29 See Pakistani Reply, supra note 27, at 18-22; DAWSON, supra note 25, at 23. 
go See Pakistani &ply, supra note 27, at 18-22; LAMB, supra note 9, at 150-51. 
!I See Pakistani Reply, supra note 27, at 6-9. 
!2 See id.; LAMB, supra note 9, at 151. 
ss See Pakistani Reply, supra note 27, at 10-11; Khan, supra note 5, at 513. 
!4 See S.C. Res. 39, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., at 2, U.N. Doc. S/654 (1948) [hereinafter S.C. 
Res. 39]; S.C. Res. 38, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. S/651 (1948) [hereinafter S.C. 
Res. 38]; DAwsoN, supra note 25, at 23. 
55 S.C. Res. 39, supra note 34, at 2. 
ss Id. 
!7 See Khan, supra note 5, at 513. 
liB S.C. Res. 47, U.N. SCOR, 3d Sess., Supp. for Apr. 1948, at 9-12, U.N. Doc. S/726 
(1948) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 47]. 
gg Id. at 9-10. 
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appointed Plebiscite Administrator would supervise a free and impar-
tial plebiscite, through which the Kashmiri people would determine to 
which state they would accede. 40 The Security Council, however, 
avoided mention of the Instrument of Accession, whose validity India 
asserted and Pakistan explicitly challenged. 41 
Neither India nor Pakistan was fully satisfied with Resolution 47.42 
Despite their disapproval, India and Pakistan both agreed to accept 
the good offices of the UNCIP to their states pursuant to Resolution 
47.43 However, in May 1948, before the UNCIP reached South Asia to 
conduct investigations, regular Pakistani troops entered the northern 
part of Kashmir to support the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, who 
were occupying the area, against the Indian military.44 When the UN-
CIP arrived in July, the presence of Pakistani regular military caught 
the UNCIP by surprise and made it concentrate on the first and pri-
mary challenge of demilitarization. 45 
The first UNCIP Resolution passed on August 13th of the same 
year reflected this development.46 In addition to calling for a ceasefire, 
the UNCIP resolution reiterated the recommendations in Resolution 
4 7 and emphasized tl1e importance of the withdrawal of the Pakistani 
military, whose presence constituted a "material change" from the 
situation originally presented to the Security Council.47 Again, however, 
aside from noting a "material change," there was little mention of the 
Instrument of Accession, which, if valid, made any Pakistani military 
presence in the region an act of aggression. 48 
India accepted the UNCIP Resolution, even though the UNCIP 
did not condemn tl1e presence of the Pakistani military.49 Pakistan also 
accepted the Resolution, but with so many qualifications that the UN-
CIP deemed the answer as "tantamount to rejection."5° First, Pakistan 
objected to the absence of definite details for a free plebiscite.51 Sec-
40 !d. at 9-12. 
41 !d. at 8-12; Pakistani Reply, supra note 27, at 9; Indian Complaint, supra note 24, at 1. 
42 See DAWSON, supra note 25, at 24. 
43 See S.C. Res. 47, supra note 38, at 9; DAwsoN, supra note 25, at 25. 
44 DAWSON, supra note 25, at 25. 
45 See id. 
46 !d. at 25-26. 
47 Interim Report of the United Nations Commission joT India and Pakistan (Nov. 9, 1948), 
U.N. Doc S/1100, at 59 (1948) [hereinafter UNCIP Interim Reporl]; see S.C. Res. 38, supm 
note 34, at 1; DAWSON, supra note 25, at 25. 
48 See UNCIP Interim Report, supm note 47, at 59; DAWSON, supra note 25, at 26. 
49 See DAWSON, supra note 25, at 26; LAMB, supra note 9, at 168-69. 
so DAWSON, supra note 25, at 26. 
51 !d. 
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ond, Pakistan wanted its military withdrawal to be synchronized, both 
in timing and number, with the withdrawal of the Indian military. 52 
Mter much deliberation, India and Pakistan eventually agreed to 
a ceasefire, which went into effect on January 1, 1949, exactly one 
year after India's complaint to the Security Council.53 The ceasefire 
created a border that gave India two-thirds control of the region and 
Pakistan one-third control.54 However, the two states were not able to 
come to an agreement on the demilitarization of Kashmir. 55 To India, 
this disagreement precluded further talks about a plebiscite;56 to Paki-
stan, this situation demonstrated India's lack of commitment to a 
plebiscite, which Pakistan saw as the ultimate goal.57 
Mter further attempts at mediation, the UNCIP was terminated 
in favor of a single person vested as a U.N. Representative to conduct 
negotiations.58 Until 1958, various U.N. Representatives attempted to 
negotiate ways to achieve demilitarization and to conduct a plebiscite, 
but none came to a permanent resolution.59 
Mter this time, the Security Council seemed to abandon its media-
tory role.60 The evidence of this shift away from its mediatory role can 
be seen in 1965, during the Second War in Kashmir.61 The Security 
Council passed Resolutions 210 and 211, its last statements on the 
Kashmir conflict.62 Both resolutions omitted reference to earlier Secu-
rity Council or UNCIP recommendations to a permanent resolution 
and implicitly pushed India and Pakistan toward using mediators out-
side of the U.N. 63 
52 Khan, supra note 5, at 514-15. 
53 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 53. 
54 See Sengupta, supra note 1, at 12. 
55 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 53. 
56 SeeSarDesai, supra note 25, at 89-90. 
57 See Khan, supra note 5, at 515-16. 
58 See S.C. Res. 80, U.N. SCOR, 5th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1469 (1950) [hereinafter S.C. 
Res. 80]; United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, Third lnte1im Report (Dec. 9, 
1949), U.N. Doc. S/1430, at 79 (1949) [hereinafter UNCIP Third lnte1i111 Report]. 
59 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 53-55. Among these attempts included those 
by General McNaugton, Sir Owen Dixon, Dr. Frank Graham, and Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring. 
See id. at 53-55, 59-60. 
60 See Khan, supra note 5, at 516. 
61 See id. at 521-22. 
62 See id. 
63 See id. at 521-23. India and Pakistan agreed to allow the SoYiet Union to be the main 
mediator, and the negotiations resulted in the Tashkent Declaration, which returned the 
situation in Kashmir to the status quo ante bellum and annulled all territorial gains. See id. 
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C. Post-1965 Negotiations and Tensions 
Mter 1965, India and Pakistan have almost exclusively dealt with 
the conflict bilaterally.64 The ceasefire line has become a de facto legal 
border called the "Line of Control" through an arrangement created 
by the Simla Agreement in 1972.65 Pakistan has repeatedly tried to 
raise the conflict in an international forum.66 However, India insists 
on dealing with Kashmir's legal status bilaterally and has resisted at-
tempts at international mediation for the last thirty years.67 
Since the rise of the separatist movement in the late 1980s, the 
stakes in Kashmir have altered and intensified.68 India has accused 
Pakistan of conducting a "proxy war" and "sponsoring terrorism" in 
the region by providing military support and training to the militants 
and by allowing infiltration across the Line of Control into Indian-
controlled Kashmir, in violation of the existing bilateral treaty re-
gime.69 Pakistan has denied all claims of direct military and other ma-
terial support and, in turn, alleges that India has not abided by its ob-
ligations according to the Security Council resolutions.7° Tensions 
seesaw between a precarious stalemate and the brink of war, with the 
threat to peace ever present)1 
II. How THE SECURITY CouNCIL's VIEW OF THE KAsHMIR DisPUTE 
WEAKENED ITS ABILITY TO BRING PERMANENT REsoLUTION 
One reason for the Security Council's failure in bringing a per-
manent resolution to the Kashmir conflict is the Council's view of the 
conflict as political rather than legai.72 From the beginning, the Secu-
rity Council framed the problem as primarily a political dispute rather 
than looking to a major legal underpinning of the dispute: the In-
strument of Accession's validity or lack thereof.73 
64 See id. at 523-24. 
65 See LAMB, supra note 9, at 297; Khan, supra note 5, at 525-29. 
66 See Khan, supra note 5, at 529-30. 
67 See id. 
68 See GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 14-16; Sengupta, supra note 1, at 12. 
69 See GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 15-16; Khan, supra note 5, at 528-30; Sen-
gupta, supra note 1, at 12. 
70 See Khan, supra note 5, at 534. 
71 See Eckholm, supra note 3, at A6; Sengupta, supm note 1, at 12. 
72 See S.C. Res. 47, supra note 38, at 8; UNCIP Third Interim Report, supra note 58, at 77; 
Fredric L. Kirgis, Jr., The United Nations at Fifty: The Security Council's First Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 506,527-29 (1995). 
73 SeeS. C. 47, supra note 38, at 8; DAWSON, supra note 25, at 23. 
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The Security Council, unlike the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), often deals with dispute resolution in a political mode and does 
not have the capacity to adjudicate on purely legal terms. 74 Neverthe-
less, the Kashmir dispute represents a situation where the Security 
Council could have given a stronger voice and stiffer backbone to its 
binding recommendations by taking a "quasi-judicial" stance and re-
ferring to the legal basis of the conflict.75 But, by side-stepping overt 
references to the Instrument of Accession, which lies at the center of 
the legal dispute over Kashmir, the Security Council could not give a 
forceful rationale for its two-pronged recommendations, which ulti-
mately weakened its recommendations for permanent solution.76 
Instead, the Security Council took a merely implicit stance that the 
Instrument of Accession was valid yet incomplete. 77 The two- pronged 
plan, demilitarization and plebiscite, was one clear demonstration of 
this implicit stance that the Security Council articulated in Resolution 
47.78 For instance, by asking Pakistan to secure the withdrawal of 
"tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein" be-
fore any withdrawal of Indian troops, the Security Council made a tacit 
statement accepting the textual validity of the Instrument of Accession 
and India's claim to sovereignty in Kashmir, even if provisionai.79 How-
ever, by outlining the details of a plebiscite, the Security Council implic-
itly found that the plain language of the Instrument, which did not 
state that Kashmir's accession was provisional or that a plebiscite was 
necessary, was incomplete.80 Recommending a plebiscite was a way of 
holding India to its political commitment, even though it had made no 
legal obligation as such. 81 
The Security Council chose not to explicitly mention the Instru-
ment of Accession in the language of Resolution 47.82 The Security 
Council simply called for Pakistan to "secure the withdrawal" of the 
tribesmen and Pakistani nationals from Kashmir, but stopped short of 
74 See Kirgis, supra note 72, at 509-10, 528-29. 
75 See GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 11-13; Kirgis, supm note 72, at 527-28. 
76 See S.C. Res. 4 7, supra note 38, at 8; UNCIP Third Inte1im Report, supra note 58, at 77-
79; Pakistani Reply, supra note 27, at 9; Indian Complaint, supra note 24, at 1; Kirgis, supra 
note 72, at 527-28. 
77 See S.C. Res. 47, supra note 38, at 9-12; GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 157-59. 
78 See id. 
79 See S.C. Res. 47, supra note 38, at 9. 
80 See id. at 10-12; GANGULY, CRISIS, supra note 9, at 157-59. 
81 See S.C. Res. 47, supra note 38, at 10-12. 
82 See id. at 8-12. 
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labeling their presence as an act of aggression.83 Similarly, the Council 
called for a plebiscite without saying that the plain language of the In-
strument was incomplete in reflecting India's obligations in the re-
gion.84 Dealing with the situation as a political dispute requiring quid 
pro quo concessions, rather than legal obligations, was a more concilia-
tory choice that proved to be too weak to compel India and Pakistan to 
take steps toward a final resolution.85 
This lack of force behind Resolution 4 7 was part of the reason In-
dia and Pakistan disapproved of the resolution.86 India believed that 
the Security Council did not take into account or give credence to the 
legality of Kashmir's accession to India, even if accession were only a 
provisional arrangement until normalcy in the region was achieved.87 
On the other hand, Pakistan wanted to emphasize the second element 
of the recommendation-the plebiscite-and deemphasize demilitari-
zation.88 
The purely political characterization of the conflict continued 
into the August 13th UNCIP Resolution of 1948.89 For instance, the 
UNCIP dealt with the entrance of the regular Pakistani military in 
May 1948, an overt act of aggression in India's view, by simply calling 
it a "material change" in circumstances in violation of Security Coun-
cil Resolution 38.90 The UNCIP Resolution reprimanded Pakistan but 
did not declare the entrance of Pakistani troops a violation of Indian 
sovereignty, regardless of whether that sovereignty was provisional or 
permanent.9I Although India accepted the UNCIP Resolution, it was 
disappointed that the UNCIP or Security Council did not condemn 
Pakistan for violating Resolution 38, which would have helped bolster 
recognition of the legality of Kashmir's accession to India.92 
The entanglement of demilitarization and plebiscite thus re-
mained unresolved. 93 Since no return to normalcy had occurred by 
1951, India constitutionally integrated into the Indian Union the por-
tion of Kashmir that it occupied, relying on the idea that it had the le-
83 See id. at 9. 
84 See id. at 10-12. 
86 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 53-55; Kirgis, supra note 72, at 527-28. 
86 See DAWSON, supra note 25, at 24. 
87 See id. 
88 See Khan, supra note 5, at 513-15. 
89 See DAWSON, supra note 25, at 25-26. 
oo See id. at 25-27. 
91 See id.; LAMB, supra note 9, at 168-69. 
92 See DAWSON, supra note 25, at 26; LAMB, supra note 9, at 169. 
93 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 53-55; Khan, supra note 5, at 514-16. 
2004] Security Council Mediation & the Kashmir Dispute 183 
gality of the Instrument of Accession's text on its side, despite Paki-
stan's strenuous protests.94 By 1965, largely because of the political re-
alities of the Cold War and likely because of the repeated failure to de-
militarize Kashmir, the Security Council disengaged from its mediatory 
efforts by conspicuously not assuming its previous mediatory role.95 
III. AcTIONs THE SEcURITY CouNCIL CouLD TAKE To REINSERT 
ITSELF AS A MEDIA TOR 
Considering the dangers to the region, renewed efforts toward 
mediation appear to be an option that could save India, Pakistan, 
South Asia, and the international order from further uncertainty.96 
According to Jacob Bercovitch, two of the conditions under which 
mediation is likely to be used are (1) when "both parties' own conflict 
management efforts have reached an impasse," and (2) when "both 
parties are prepared to cooperate to break their stalemate. "97 How-
ever, at this point, such mediation is only possible if the Security 
Council reengages India, whose various governments have become 
resistant to Security Council mediation.98 
The problem remains that, even if India admits that it has 
reached an impasse over the Kashmir conflict under current bilateral 
negotiation attempts, India will likely continue to resist cooperating 
with Pakistan in seeking outside mediation.99 One of several reasons is 
that India's initial attempt to use the Security Council to resolve the 
dispute failed to bring peace.100 However, Pakistan seems amenable to 
international mediation.101 Should the Security Council act as that 
mediator, it should attempt to reengage India in the mediatory proc-
ess, which entails considering why its efforts failed initially, and what 
94 See GANGULY, ORIGINS, supra note 1, at 54-55; Khan, supra note 5, at 517-20. 
95 See Khan, supra note 5, at 520-22. 
96 See Sengupta, supra note 1, at 12. 
97 See Anthony Wan is St. John, The Mediating Role in the Kashmir Dispute Between India 
and Pakistan, 21 SPG FLETCHER F. WoRLD AFF. 173, 176 (1997) (quoting Jacob Bercovitch, 
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India would require for its faith to be restored in the powers of the 
Security Councii.l02 
To reengage India, the Security Council should consider refocus-
ing the legal framework of the conflict, rather than treating the dis-
pute in political terms as it had in earlier mediatory attempts, espe-
cially if the Security Council continues to deal with the Kashmir 
dispute under Article 34.1°3 Considering the changes of the last thirty 
years, referring to the Instrument of Accession's validity, while a use-
ful starting point, does not seem to be the most realistic way to ap-
proach the conflict.104 Instead, the proper legal starting point to re-
engage India at this juncture should be the policing of the Line of 
Control, which has ripened into the de facto border in the last three 
decades since the Simla Agreement, the current Indo-Pakistani treaty 
that controls the two countries' actions in Kashmir.l05 
Since the rise of the separatist movement in Kashmir, India's m<Uor 
and consistent complaint against Pakistan has been its support of 
infiltration across the Line of Control in violation of the Simla Agree-
ment, its current bilateral treaty arrangement.l06 Interestingly, India's 
current accusations are analogous to those that it lodged against Paki-
stan's alleged support of the tribesmen and other "invaders" at the be-
ginning of the Kashmir conflict. 107 Pakistan's denial of support, claim-
ing that the infiltrators are independent actors whose movements 
Pakistan is not able to control officially, sounds similar as well.l08 In bi-
lateral negotiations, India has claimed that it will not make meaningful 
concessions to Pakistan until sponsorship, direct or indirect, of cross-
border infiltration ceases.109 If the Line of Control becomes the new 
focus, then the Security Council could avoid its earlier mistake: first, by 
making a good faith effort to investigate, and then, if necessary, by de-
nouncing cross-border infiltration across the Line of Control.110 
Taking a strong stance against cross-border infiltration does not 
mean that the Security Council has to grant an absolute moral superi-
ority to the Indian case by treating Pakistan as the naked aggressor.lll 
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Since January 2002, even Pakistan has attempted to address the sup-
posedly unauthorized crossing over into Indian-controlled Kashmir by 
its nationals, particularly as to members of Islamic fundamentalist 
groups that incite and respond with violence in the region. 112 How-
ever, to have the Security Council or a Security Council-mandated 
committee such as the UNCIP to investigate these discreet issues-the 
alleged crossing of the Line of Control and violation of the Simla 
Agreement-might give India the incentive to reengage in media-
tion.113 India has an interest in taking help from the Security Council 
in this respect because India's major challenge in the region has been 
controlling illegal movement across the Line ofControl. 114 This inves-
tigation of, and stance against, cross-border infiltration could be a 
starting point for reengaging India.115 
CONCLUSION 
The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has me-
andered dangerously through several phases since its inception. The 
Security Council attempted to use its mediatory influence at the early 
stages of the conflict but could not bring about a permanent resolu-
tion. One reason for its failure is that the Security Council dealt with 
the dispute over Kashmir's legal status primarily as a political dispute. 
The Security Council weakened its recommendations by not making 
explicit the core legal issue of the dispute, which was the Instrument 
of Accession. Reference to the legal framework of accession might 
have made the obligations that India and Pakistan owed more explicit 
and more difficult to avoid. 
The Security Council should now attempt to reengage India, the 
party resistant to mediation, by dealing with the legal aspects of the 
Kashmir conflict. One of these legal issues is India's claims of Paki-
stani-supported cross-border infiltration over the Line of Control. In-
dia has an incentive to reinvest itself in Security Council mediation if 
the Security Council can make a good faith effort to investigate and 
take a firm stance on this issue. 
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